This paper investigates the drastic reduction in public spending in OECD countries during the 1990s. Using a panel data set of 18 countries, we find this adjustment to be a general OECD development, beginning in 1994, and that participation in the Maastricht Treaty or in the Stability and Growth Pact does not introduce additional effects. In the long run, this adjustment is estimated to reduce the ratio of primary government spending to output by about 4 percentage points. There is no evidence of differential adjustment in expansions or recessions. We also find that declines in interest payments on public debt are followed by increases in primary expenditures by about the same amount. The econometric framework makes it possible to compute the long-run ratios of government expenditures to GDP in the 18 OECD countries in the sample. 
Introduction
There was a drastic reduction in public spending in the OECD during the 1990s. Primary government expenditures declined from a cyclically adjusted, weighted average of 36.4 percent of GDP in 1992 to 34.1 percent in 1998. Since 1999, however, primary expenditures increased once more. Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of the average ratio of government spending to output in the OECD, using PPP adjusted GDP as weights. The solid line represents the ratio of cyclically adjusted primary spending to GDP whereas the dashed line represents that ratio including interest payments. Both reflect the spending cuts of the early 1990s. Towards the end of the sample, the primary spending-output ratio bounces back while the ratio including interest payment remains constant.
Government Expenditures
(Weighted Average -Cyclically Adjusted) We use an econometric model that makes it possible to compute the dynamics of government spending and long-run levels in the different countries for total primary spending and its components: government consumption, transfers and subsidies, and public investment.
The analysis is fact-finding in nature. The purpose is to characterize the adjustment empirically, rather than to evaluate it normatively, as conducted for example by Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003) , or to propose changes to the current rules, as in Fatas, Von Hagen, Hallett, Strauch and Sibert (2003) . Gali and Perotti (2003) analyze the fiscal implications of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, and find that they did not reduce the ability of governments to conduct countercyclical fiscal policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric framework for the analysis of aggregate primary government expenditures as well as the computation of the effects of the fiscal adjustments in the 1990s on the long-run ratios of government expenditures to output. Section 3 reports the empirical results. In Section 4 we extend the analysis by disaggregating primary expenditures into three components: government consumption, transfers and subsidies, and public investment. Section 5 concludes.
Econometric Framework for
Aggregate Primary Expenditure The basic equation for aggregate government expenditures is then specified as , 18 ,.., 1
where it x is a vector of control variables affecting the level of . thereafter. The total adjustment is captured by the accumulated effects, which will be reflected in the long-run ratio.
The Long Run
The long-run value of g i can be obtained from equation (1) 
Results for Aggregate Government Spending

The Data
The panel data set is composed of 18 countries, 12 of them in the EMU-Austria, 
Estimation Results
We report first a preliminary estimation of equation (1), concentrating on the adjustment variable A . For this purpose, the fiscal adjustment and cyclical variables are constrained to enter in a symmetric form, i.e., , elsewhere. 2 We also used an alternative specification, excluding the three countries with a derogation status-the U.K., Sweden and Denmark-from the Maast variable. The second form is a dummy variable for all countries in the sample, taking the value 1 starting in a specific year during the 1990s, and 0 previously. Table 1 The results from this preliminary specification are presented in Table 1 . and even border-line significant coefficient. Hence, it appears that the adjustment is a general OECD phenomenon, and not specific to EU countries. The positive coefficient of SGP resembles a partial reversal. The results are practically the same when we use the Maast specification that excludes the U.K., Sweden and Denmark.
In Table 2 we report the estimation of the complete specification of equation (1).
The adjustment and cyclical behavior is allowed to be asymmetric; and the interest payments and control variables are included. The control variables are: The population growth rate, , ln pop and the fractions of the young (0-14 years of age), , young and the old (65 and older), , old in the population. In Table A .2 in the appendix, we report the inclusion of an inequality index. This variable is expected to have positive effects. The estimate of the ratcheting coefficient The shares of old and young in the population are insignificant, but population growth has a positive and significant effect.
The estimate of 14 . 0
indicates that the convergence to the long-run value of g takes place quite gradually.
We also ran these regressions including only the 15 countries that joined the Maastricht Treaty in order to explore different behavior. The results, are similar to those presented in Table 2 . This supports the notion that fiscal behavior is similar in all countries in the sample.
We tested the possibility of an upwards adjustment of total government expenditure after 1998. This is done by adding a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after 1998 and 0 elsewhere. It turned out that the corresponding coefficient was not significant. This result suggests that the upward trend after 1998 is explained by the other explanatory variables.
Implications of the Results
Here we address the dynamic effects of the results in 
Expenditure decomposition
Here we focus on government expenditures disaggregated into three components: (1) consumption expenditure, (2) transfers and subsidies, and (3) public investment. The sum of the three components is somewhat lower than the total primary expenditure figures used in the aggregate analysis due to items such as capital expenditure, which are not included in the separate components.
Econometric Framework
Given the results with aggregate expenditure, the adjustment in the 1990s is assumed here to be symmetric. For expenditure in category , 3 , 2 , 1 j the basic equation (1) 
The Long Run
The long-run ratios of the different spending components to output can be obtained following a procedure similar to that used for the aggregate spending case but now applied to the vector of spending-output ratios. In the long run we have g, 0 Inverting the matrix , this equation can be expressed as
Similarly to aggregate spending, the focus of the analysis is the quantitative adjustment since the 1990s. The results will reflect not only the direct effects measured by the coefficients of the dummy variable for the 1990s on the estimation, but also the indirect effects from the interaction between the components (the crowding out of the individual category by spending on the others). The results are shown in The direct effects of the adjustment from 1994 apply mainly to consumption expenditure and transfers, while the coefficient on investment is not significant.
Transfers crowd out government consumption, but not the opposite.
Consumption and transfers are countercyclical and asymmetric-and the corresponding coefficients are statistically significant. The results from aggregate spending, presented previously, reflect this behavior. For investment, the results are quite different. In high-growth years, investment is acyclical whereas in lowgrowth years, investment appears procyclical, with a coefficient that is almost significant at the 5 percent level.
Population growth has a strong effect on transfers and investment.
The share of the old in the population increases government consumption, but its impact on transfers is not significant at 5 percent significance level. We can use the same procedure to compute the implications of population aging.
Given the coefficient of the variable old in Table 3, Finally in this section, we report in Table 4 the long-run ratios of government spending to output in the 18 countries in the sample and, in parenthesis, the ratios in the last year in the sample. The computation uses the equation shown above together with:
(a) the coefficients in Table 3 In half of the countries in the sample, long-run government consumption is higher than in the last year of the sample. For transfers, this feature characterizes almost all countries. Finally, for total expenditure in some countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom and the U.S.), long-run values are similar to those in the last year of the sample, but for most they are higher.
Concluding comments
We found that the government spending adjustment began in 1994, and that it can be characterized as an OECD phenomenon rather than as a phenomenon specific to countries participating in the Maastricht Treaty or the Stability and Growth Pact.
The spending adjustment was estimated to reduce the long-run ratio of primary spending to GDP by about 4 percentage points. As shown in Figure 2 , the contribution of this adjustment to average spending by 2003 was about 3.3 percentage points of GDP.
We did not find evidence that the adjustment is carried out differently in expansions and recessions.
The results from aggregate spending indicate that a decline in interest payments generates a long-run increase in other expenditure that is larger by 1.4 percentage points.
However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that this effect is statistically different from 1.
In any event, this result implies that in the long run, declining debt servicing does not reduce the total amount of government spending.
We found that the bouncing back of the average ratio of primary spending to GDP since 1998 can be quantitatively explained by either the reverse crowding out of the decline in interest payments, or the accumulated ratcheting generated by asymmetric cyclical spending behavior.
The analysis of the spending components indicates that the long-run effect of the spending adjustment was concentrated on transfers. The long-run effect on government consumption was estimated to be much smaller, and the corresponding effect on public investment was very small.
Appendix A
We also considered HP-filtered output as the cyclical variable (as in Gali and Perotti, 2003 In general, the fit of the regressions is poorer than in Table 2 , as reflected by the lower 2 R and W D. . statistics. Other differences are that the coefficient of countercyclical policy in recessions is no significant here, and that the variable old is positive and significant. 
